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WISH LIST 
WILDERNESS ENDGAME IN THE BLACK HILLS 
NATIONAL FOREST 
ROBERT WELLMAN CAMPBELL 
In January 1979 Dave Foreman loosened his 
tie, propped his cowboy boots up on his desk, 
and brooded awhile on RARE II. In a second 
try at Roadless Area Review and Evaluation 
(RARE), the u.s. Forest Service had just spent 
two years deciding once and for all how much 
of its undeveloped land should be designated 
Wilderness. To Foreman, a Washington execu-
tive of the Wilderness Society, RARE II tasted 
of bitter defeat, and he lonesomely "popped 
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the top on another Stroh's" as he brooded. The 
Forest Service had just recommended increas-
ing its Wilderness acres from 18 million to 
33 million, or about a sixth of its 190 million 
acres. Foreman wished for much more, and he 
regretted that conservationists like himself had 
been moderate in their demands and tactics. 
By 1980 a disgusted Foreman had "loosened 
his tie" all the way back to New Mexico, out of 
the Wilderness Society, and into Earth First!, a 
radical new environmental group that was best 
known for advocating sabotage of logging and 
construction projects. As Foreman told this 
story in his autobiography, Confessions of an 
Eco-Warrior, RARE II was the last straw'! 
Around the same time, South Dakota con-
gressman Jim Abdnor also held a RARE II 
postmortem, but in a lighter mood. Meeting 
with environmental activists in his Rapid 
City office, including Sierra Clubber Sam 
Clauson, who related this story years later, the 
Republican congressman lit a cigar, put his feet 
up on his desk, and asked without much care, 
"Now what the hell are we going to do about 
this wilderness thing?" The Black Hills, lying 
in Abdnor's "West River" district of western 
South Dakota, were to get their first official 
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Wilderness. There was some question how to 
name it-after a military explorer, a Lakota 
holy man, or a conservationist governor-and 
though Abdnor was not enthusiastic about an 
Indian name, he could accept anything. RARE 
II had come out satisfactorily for Abdnor, but 
he had bigger fish to fry as he worked toward 
his 1980 campaign to unseat Senator George 
McGovern.2 
Two very different reactions from two differ-
ent perspectives. Dave Foreman, having little 
to do with South Dakota, typifies the national 
reaction: angry rejection from both sides. But 
the reaction in the Black Hills region was prob-
ably closer to Abdnor and the environmental-
ists: some interest, some controversy, but also 
some rather cool satisfaction. This article 
looks at RARE II from the latter perspective, 
to shed a different light on the sausage-making 
of wilderness legislation.3 This illuminates two 
issues in particular. First, as a very small state in 
both population and in attitude, South Dakota 
provides a useful example of state-federal ten-
sion in environmental politics. Who would call 
the shots in this case, D.C. or S.D.? Second, as 
a western area developed to a level more typical 
of the East and of the nation as a whole, the 
Black Hills provide a view into how a postin-
dustrial America might think about the nature 
in its own well-worked back yard. The question 
is whether we believe in redemption for land-
whether nature heals or nature is what was 
there before the wound. Do we believe our land 
can revert even to "go-back wilderness," or do 
we see development as a one-way street?4 
RARE II was meant to settle the political 
contest that had been fought over wilderness 
since 1964, as the endgame to decide once 
and for all the winners and losers among 
federal lands. RARE II was a modified ver-
sion of the process dictated by the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1970, which by 
the time of RARE II was already a well-prac-
ticed set piece within the broader politics of 
environmentalism. These NEPA contests were 
not just about the specific policy questions at 
hand; they were also strategic, symbolic plays 
in the never-ending contest over the nation's 
public lands. Partly for this reason, the case 
of the Black Hills is interesting less for its 
unsurprising result-Wilderness status for the 
Norbeck Wildlife Preserve-than for how the 
political game played out. 
PREGAME (1874-1977) 
The historical background of the Black Hills 
is beyond our scope, but a few points are rel-
evant. The first is just how developed the Black 
Hills were. George Custer's 1874 invasion trig-
gered a powerful, long-term transformation of 
the landscape. Immigrants were busy building 
mines, towns, farms, sawmills, and most impor-
tantly, roads for almost a quarter century before 
the creation of the Black Hills Forest Reserve 
in 1897, later renamed the Black Hills National 
Forest.5 At that point the federal government 
assumed control of a working forest, an "estate 
with many tenants" who certainly resented 
Democrat Grover Cleveland's eleventh-hour 
proclamation creating the reserve.6 The lands 
they owned are still private inholdings today. 
Federal timber sales began immediately, and 
most of the national forest has been repeat-
edly logged. These "Hills," though actually 
old, weathered mountains, have a moderate 
topography that makes access to timber quite 
easy. And plentiful snowfall and rainfall in the 
spring and early summer make the Black Hills a 
natural nursery for abundant ponderosa pine. 
So this was, and is, a domesticated place. 
And yet, like many places, it can give you a fair 
impression of wildness. Once off the highway 
the slopes block your sight, the pines hush 
your hearing, something hits your nose the 
right way, and there is some opportunity to get 
lost if you cooperate. A unique mix of plants 
grows in the Black Hills: northern, western, 
and eastern forest species overlap at the far 
ends of their ranges, blending with the short-
grass prairie that flows up the valleys from the 
plains and becomes quite tallgrass in the Black 
Hills' wetter climate.7 And people did act to 
preserve these natural qualities, most notably 
Peter Norbeck, South Dakota's conservationist 
governor and senator. Norbeck created Custer 
WILDERNESS ENDGAME IN THE BLACK HILLS NATIONAL FOREST 289 
State Park, one of the largest state parks in the 
nation, as well as what's now called Norbeck 
Wildlife Preserve.8 The Preserve is on national 
forest land and includes Harney Peak, the tall-
est point east of the Rockies at 7,242 feet. 
Since World War II the Black Hills economy 
has been an interesting contradiction of tour-
ism and extraction. Winnebago campers and 
logging trucks; the faces at Rushmore and 
the open pit at Homestake Mine; the pretty 
and the prolific, tightly intertwined. These 
same contradictions pulled the U.S. Forest 
Service in opposite directions. Congress for-
malized this tug-of-war in the Multiple Use 
Act of 1960 and the Wilderness Act of 1964. 
The Wilderness Act gave the Forest Service 
ten years to recommend which of its wild 
lands should be managed as official, "big W" 
Wildernesses. (Only acts of Congress could 
actually create them.) The Forest Service met 
this deadline with an effort called the Roadless 
Area Review and Evaluation, or RARE. But its 
results were criticized, legally challenged, and 
ultimately discarded. 
Jimmy Carter, an avowed conservation-
ist, took office in 1977. He appointed Rupert 
Cutler, a former academic and Wilderness 
Society executive, as the assistant secretary of 
agriculture with responsibility for the Forest 
Service. Cutler disliked the slow, uncertain 
process of piecemeal Wilderness designations, 
which pleased neither side. He planned a new 
review with consistency, proper planning, and 
public involvement. He wanted to move as 
many lands as possible to either official wilder-
ness or nonwilderness use. When he announced 
his ambitious plan in early 1977, wilderness 
advocates derisively nicknamed it RARE II, 
but the Forest Service quickly Yankee-Doodled 
this nickname as the program's official title? 
So from Custer to Cutler was just over a 
century, with no lands in the Black Hills des-
ignated as Wildernesses. Even the Norbeck 
Preserve had roads, grazing permits, fences, 
campsites, cabins, inholdings, and even a Jeep 
concession selling rides to the top of Harney 
Peak. The Black Hills was (to paraphrase the 
act itself) an area where the earth and its 
community of life were untrammeled by the 
Wilderness Act of 1964, where preservation 
itself was a visitor who did not remain. Now, 
for almost exactly two years, the Forest Service 
would look again, in a process divided like an 
athletic contest into four quarters, in this case 
lasting six months each. This sounds like a 
long time, but for evaluating tens of millions of 
acres across the continent it was an ambitious 
schedule. 
FIRST QUARTER: INVENTORY 
(SPRING To FALL 1977) 
From late spring to fall 1977, Black Hills 
National Forest officials inventoried the 
region to determine what "road less and unde-
veloped areas" existed. By late July, Rangers 
and Supervisors were revising the list, phon-
ing each other as they pored over maps. By 
August the Forest was soliciting public com-
ment through news releases and at least two 
informational meetings in Sundance and 
Rapid City. Citizens were asked to critique 
the draft inventory and to suggest criteria for 
judging the road less areas. The Black Hills 
Group of the Sierra Club submitted a list of 
fifteen roadless areas; fourteen were rejected 
and one (Sand Creek) was added to the list of 
candidates. lO 
Nationally, 227 of these "workshops" 
attracted 17,000 people, and with all the 
publicity, spurred more than 50,000 public 
comments. But the Black Hills National Forest 
received only ninety-five written responses. 
Those who did show at the Black Hills meet-
ings were given extra time to speak. One Forest 
official noted that since RARE I had skipped 
over the Black Hills, residents had skipped that 
round of public involvement and controversy 
in wilderness issues. I I 
During September 1977 the Forest office 
in Custer and the Regional office in Denver 
together evaluated the comments, finalized a 
list, and forwarded it to Washington and the 
press. Where RARE I had found no roadless 
areas, RARE II found four: two in Wyoming 
and two in South Dakota. 
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FIG. 1. Area map. Map by the author. 
Inyan Kara Mountain was by far the small-
est of the four (Fig. 1). This 6,400-foot peak is 
a western outlier of the Black Hills with two 
square miles of Forest Service land around it. 
There were no roads through this area, or even 
public roads to this area. While Devils Tower, 
thirty miles northwest, is a more spectacular 
SOUTH 
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HillS 
NATIONAL 
FOREST 
Norbeck .. ' 
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Crazy Horse + '1.. .... 
a 
Custer 
(Forest HQ) 
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Rapid City 
and well-known landmark, Inyan Kara (prob-
ably corrupted Lakota for "stone maker" or "the 
stone is made") was part of local lore as the 
point of several Indian-European encounters. 
On July 22, 1874, Custer's expedition camped 
four miles to the east, and the next day Custer 
and some of his men climbed the mountain 
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Darton. N. H.. 458. Black Hliis. South Dakota. 
Looking east towards Harney Peak. in the granite area. Lantern slide 
62210. 459 No Negative. 
FIG. 2. Looking east toward Harney Peak. Nelson Horatio Darton, 1898. Courtesy of U.S. Geological Survey 
Photographic Library. 
itself. While waiting for the haze of Indian fires 
to clear, they chiseled "74 Custer" into stone, as 
is visible today.12 
Sand Creek was the biggest of the four, about 
nineteen square miles of steep, forested land 
just inside Wyoming. Lying near the edge of 
the Black Hills dome, in the northwest corner 
of the national forest, this area dropped almost 
a half mile over its five-mile run, making it hard 
to log profitably. It was locally popular for hunt-
ing, snowmobiling, and cross-country skiing.!3 
Beaver Park also lay on the edge of the 
national forest, but in the northeast near the 
busy Spearfish-Rapid City corridor, close to 
Interstate 90 and the town of Sturgis. Its name, 
like that of the Holy Roman Empire, was a 
tangle of historical irony. The Forest Service 
named this densely forested "road less area" 
after one of its few open areas, located at a 
junction of two old roads. The area's gulches 
had only intermittent streams, and so presum-
ably no beavers. Instead, local tradition traced 
the name to a Mr. Beaver, owner of a sawmill 
near the park.14 
Norbeck had a different kind of busyness. Its 
sixteen square miles lay around Harney Peak, 
and in the center of the Black Hills' main tour-
ist attractions. Mount Rushmore was imme-
diately northeast, and the enormous Crazy 
Horse sculpture to the southwest. To the south 
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FIG. 3. Area attributes and draft environmental impact statement alternatives. Figure by the author. 
and southeast lay the popular Custer State 
Park with its scenic Needles, tourist highways, 
recreational lakes, and other attractions. The 
Norbeck roadless area lay inside the Norbeck 
Wildlife Preserve, created in 1920 and named 
for the hallowed Senator Norbeck. 
For the next year and a half these four pieces 
of ground were debated, defended, and dispar-
aged, first by the Forest Service. 
SECOND QUARTER: THE FOREST SERVICE 
EVALUATES (FALL 1977 To SPRING 1978) 
Soon after the four areas were chosen as 
candidates, Forest Service staff were at work 
appraising them in several ways. In the winter 
of 1977-78 the local and regional offices were 
assigned the task of quantifying the commod-
ity potential, wildness, and political popularity 
of each candidate area. These data became 
the basis for all future stages of the RARE II 
process; they were used to produce the Forest 
Service's policy alternatives, to spur public 
comments, and ultimately to justify the Forest 
Service's proposal to Congress. 
Commodity values: National forests produce 
wood but also livestock forage, water, energy 
and minerals, wildlife habitat, and human 
recreation. Documenting these commodities 
is what foresters do, so for the most part com-
modity assessments for RARE II were nothing 
new (Fig. 3). One area stood out: Sand Creek. 
It had much more total timber than the other 
areas, and its timber was already planned for 
harvest. It also fed many times more cattle than 
the other areas combined. 
Wildness: How on earth do you quantify wild-
ness? As in any theological question you return 
to a sacred text, in this case the Wilderness Act 
of 1964. Its wording was scrutinized for guid-
ance, and four phrases were picked out as cri-
teria. A Wilderness's four "requisite attributes" 
would be natural integrity, apparent natural-
ness, outstanding opportunities for solitude, and 
outstanding opportunities for primitive recre-
ation. The Forest Service's Wilderness Attribute 
Rating System (WARS) rated each attribute 
from 1 to 7 and added them; thus a perfect 
WARS score was 28. The average WARS score 
nationally was 18,48. The Black Hills National 
Forest's scores are in Figure 3. South Dakota's 
areas (Norbeck and Beaver Park) led with 21 
and 20, while Wyoming's areas (Inyan Kara and 
Sand Creek) lagged at 15 and 14.15 
Social analysis: The roadless areas' political 
values (the Forest Service called them "social" 
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FIG. 4. Social analyses. Figure by the author. 
values) were even harder to quantify than wild-
ness. Again the task was approached by break-
ing it up. The heart of the social analysis was a 
list of interest groups; unnamed Forest officers 
(apparently at the District level) estimated, 
in narrative and a numerical scale, how badly 
each group wanted each road less area to be des-
ignated one way or the other, and why (Fig. 4), 
The order of support echoed WARS: Norbeck, 
Beaver Park, Inyan Kara, Sand Creek. But in 
this case the big gap fell between Norbeck and 
the rest; people apparently did not appreciate 
or desire Beaver Park's wildness.!6 
The narrative portion mostly explained the 
obvious: interest groups opposed Wilderness 
designation for any area that they wanted 
to benefit from nonwilderness management. 
Many of these were anticipated future benefits, 
but some, such as grazing, were already being 
enjoyed. Keep in mind that these were Forest 
Service perceptions; the social analysis essen-
tially described what political flak the Forest 
Service expected from various allocations. This 
analysis reveals several points: that the envi-
Beaver Nor-
Park beck Legend 
M 
M 
m 
m 
M 
m 
I 
M 
W 
m 
3.1 
y y=yes 
y blank = no 
USFS officer's e!!rce~tlon S~mbol value 
w Wilderness strongly favored W 7 
Wildemess moderately favored W 6 
Wilderness slightly favored w 5 
M Split opinion 4 
m Multiple use slighUy favored m 3 
w Multiple use moderately favored M 2 
W Multiple use strongly favored M 
No real opinion expressed (blank) none 
w 
W 
W 
W 
W 
W 
W 
5.2 
ronmentalists were politically isolated but their 
opponents were well allied, that public reac-
tion was really about wilderness in general and 
not specific areas, and that the Forest Service 
revealed a particular view in the terms it used. 
First, on the term "multiple use": The Multiple 
Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 expressly 
stated that "multiple use" included wilderness. 
Environmentalists likewise stressed that mul-
tiple use never meant "every use on every acre," 
and that wilderness itself served various pur-
poses, For these reasons the Forest Service was 
often careful to speak of wilderness vs. "other 
uses:' But notice that in setting up this numeri-
cal scale, the Forest Service placed "wilderness" 
and "multiple use" at opposite poles. South 
Dakotans, including Representative Abdnor, 
often said "multipurpose" instead of "multiple 
use," a subtle distinction; a drawer of tools is not 
multipurpose but a single 5-in-1 pocketknife is. 
In practice, the phrases were used interchange-
ably as meaning "not wilderness:' Only a "Wise 
Use Act" could hand preservationists a deeper 
rhetorical defeatP 
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Second, outside of Norbeck, "environ-
mentalists/preservationists" had few allies. 
Nonmotorized recreationists for Inyan Kara 
were the only other pro-wilderness group in the 
table (and "little interest expressed" was noted 
even here). Potential allies in research, fishing, 
and nongame wildlife were almost unheard. 
Environmentalists were also perceived as spread-
ing their support, whereas timber and motorized 
recreation were sometimes noted as picking and 
choosing, accepting Norbeck as a "compromise 
area ... to get what they want in other areas." 
But we should note here that generalized, 
not site-specific, reactions were the rule. Sand 
Creek's grazing was ten times greater than 
Inyan Kara's, but the same reaction from ranch-
ers was expected. In fact, those two areas had 
the most and least total resources, but their 
overall support was similar. 
Finally, in contrast to the isolated envi-
ronmentalists, the social analysis portrayed 
the commodity interests as tightly allied. In 
this account city hall and the Chamber of 
Commerce were deemed identical in their sen-
timents. For "elected officials," three times the 
unnamed Forest official simply wrote, "Same as 
[Chamber of Commerce and civic groups]." 
The officer's "overall" perceptions of local 
sentiment closely match the Chamber-town 
hall consensus. These were sharper than the 
(admittedly simple) averages shown in Figure 3, 
with Norbeck rated high and the Wyoming 
areas at the lowest level. Beaver Park was again 
in the middle. The officer also added notes to 
each, labeled "Sense of Local Control": 
[Norbeck:] The local public presently views 
the R.A. as a "Wilderness" and wants it 
to remain that way. Unless the area is 
designated as WildernessL] or M.U. with 
stringent controls on development and 
vehicular travel, the local public will feel 
that Government and outside pressure 
groups have made the decision and their 
input was not used. 
[Inyan Kara, Sand Creek, and Beaver Park:] 
General feeling ... [is] that Gov't will make 
the decision regardless of local input. Gov't 
is influenced by big city or eastern pressure 
groups who know nothing of the local situ-
ation. This feeling will be reinforced if the 
R.A. is designated as wilderness. 
In other words, outsiders are environmental-
ists who want new Wildernesses; locals want 
Norbeck designated only because it is already 
an unofficial wilderness anyway. Local Forest 
Service personnel may have shared this sense, 
but the documents are silent on tensions 
within the Forest Service. The major "interest 
group" omitted from the social analysis was, of 
course, the Forest Service itself. 
By February of 1978, almost a year after the 
start of RARE II, the Black Hills National 
Forest had finished its analyses and shipped 
them up the line to Denver and Washington. 
Other information trickled in; in March Forest 
Service lawyers opined on Norbeck's status, 
and in June the Department of Energy assess-
ments circulated. In June the Forest Service 
published the RARE II draft environmental 
impact statement as required by law. The main 
statement, a thick, dry tome, formally proposed 
the national program, while state supplements 
described individual areas. 
The task of a draft environmental impact 
statement is to describe an area, propose alter-
native plans for it, and assess how each alterna-
tive would change the area, both physically and 
socially. Figure 3 shows how each alternative 
allocated the Black Hills areas. Three alterna-
tives (E, F, and G) "rounded out" the National 
Wilderness Preservation System with low, 
medium, and high levels of ideal landform, 
ecosystem, and wildlife representation. Two 
alternatives (C and I) took the obvious tack 
of balancing wilderness benefits against com-
modity costs. And one alternative (H) followed 
local politics. 
Unlike an ordinary environmental impact 
statement covering one project in one place, 
this national or "programmatic" environmen-
tal impact statement served less as a factual 
analysis and more as an enormous paper 
ballot. 
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Inlen Kara Send Creek 
II'\$t8te personal 21·5 81% 21·8 72% 
II'\$t8te form 35-0 100% 34-0 100% 
Outst8te personal 24-42 36% 35-55 39% 
Outstate form 1438- 6 100% 1534-4 100% 
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Personal 45-47 49% 56-63 47% 
Form 1473·6 100% 1568-4 1000/. 
Total 1518- 53 97% 1624-67 96% 
FIG. 5. Public comments. Figure by the author. 
THIRD QUARTER: PUBLIC COMMENT 
(SPRING To FALL 1978) 
And so the process had been plopped, heav-
ily, back into the public's court. Forest Service 
chief John McGuire described this phase of 
RARE II as a kind of studious outing: "The 
public will have the field season of 1978 to 
check the accuracy of these data and present 
their recommendations." Some of this civic 
tramping of the grassroots may have occurred, 
but it was lost in the publicity machines that 
buried the Forest Service in bales of homog-
enized "astroturf" balloting. For all U.S. road-
less areas, the 1977 inventory round of public 
involvement reaped 50,000 comments. By con-
trast, the 1978 harvest topped a third of a mil-
lion signatures. A special clearinghouse was set 
up in Salt Lake City to count all the comments 
and summarize their contents. Forest Service 
personnel from around the country, including 
the Black Hills, were moved temporarily to 
Salt Lake to meet the November 1 deadline for 
processing comments. IS 
Regarding the Black Hills areas, after get-
ting thirty-four comments in the inventory 
Legend 
NW-W signalllres. NW% 
Beaver Park Norbeck 
27-42 39% 24·54 31% 
843-6 99% 843·4 100% 
17·26 40% 15·40 27% 
631-0 100% 631·0 100% 
870-48 95% 867-58 94% 
648·26 96% 646-40 94% 
44-68 39% 39·94 29% 
1474- 6 100% 1474·4 100% 
1518- 74 95% 1513- 98 94% 
Total 
93-109 46% 
1755·10 99% 
91 ·163 36% 
4234-10 100% 
1648-119 94% 
4325-173 96% 
164·272 40% 
5989·20 100% 
6173-292 95% 
Legend 
Inside" personal 
outside = form 
shaded =pro-W 
pattern '" outstale 
round, the Forest Service probably heard from 
over 1,500 people in this round. (Since most 
people commented on all four areas, over 6,000 
"signatures" were recorded.) Comments ran 
more than 20-to-1 against Wilderness designa-
tion. Ninety-three percent were form letters 
(petitions, preprinted forms, etc.). Figure 5 
depicts the comments by origin, format, and 
preference. 
The most obvious pattern is that Inyan Kara 
and Sand Creek were twins, as are Beaver Park 
and Norbeck. As the internal social analysis 
predicted, overall political response was gen-
eral, not site-specific. Personal letters favored 
Wilderness by about 3 to 2, but form letters 
almost purely opposed Wilderness for every 
road less area, and the forms produced far more 
"signatures." The Salt Lake processors noted 
that pro-Wilderness letters tended to name 
specific areas but anti-Wilderness letters named 
entire states or forests. 
Where did the letters about the Black Hills 
National Forest come from? The Forest Service 
recorded whether each comment came from 
inside or outside the state of the area it com-
mented on. For this Forest, split between two 
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states, this requires a bit of syllogism. First, the 
Wyoming areas received very few comments 
from Wyoming. Second, it is very unlikely 
that a South Dakotan or Wyomingite would 
comment on areas lying just across the border 
but not on the areas within their own state. So 
South Dakota's outs tate letters were not from 
Wyoming. Therefore all four areas must have 
received hundreds of letters from outside the 
two-state area. But from where? 
Among the stacks of cards and letters, 
the staff in Salt Lake noticed over a dozen 
organized campaigns targeted at the Rocky 
Mountain Region (Colorado, Wyoming, South 
Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas). Almost all 
of them opposed Wilderness. Two campaigns 
were Wyoming-wide. Another "extensive post 
card form campaign" supported nonwilderness 
for all four Black Hills areas; many of these 
cards were hand-annotated: "especially Sand 
Creek." Another card campaign targeted Sand 
Creek alone. A "large number" of forms came 
from Chicago, in four versions for four of the 
Region's Forests, including the Black Hills 
National Forest. These were formatted like 
ballots with checkboxes, but they were almost 
uniformly checked nonwilderness. 
Several states had pro-Wilderness campaigns 
(''Alternative W"), but apparently South Dakota 
had none; Wyoming did, but proposed nonwil-
derness for its two Black Hills areas. 
The public comments partly belied the 
Forest Service's social analysis. In this stage 
locals did oppose Wilderness, but for all four 
areas. And there were indeed "outside ... big 
city or eastern" pressure groups, but far from 
being environmentalist, they were almost 
purely anti-Wilderness. 
FOURTH QUARTER: FOREST SERVICE 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
(NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1978) 
The Forest Service wanted its RARE II 
recommendations to be ready when the new 
Congress convened in January 1979 so that 
areas allocated to nonwilderness could be 
"released" and utilized that year. To do this it 
had to start acting before the October 1, 1978, 
deadline for public comments. In September 
the chief of the Forest Service directed his 
Regional Foresters to adjust boundaries of the 
areas if they sensed that doing so would "mini-
mize resource conflicts." This meant removing 
commodity areas from proposed Wildernesses, 
since nobody opposes a proposed Wilderness 
because it is slightly too small. The Black Hills 
areas did not change. 
Assistant Supervisor Frank Smedley handled 
RARE II for the Black Hills National Forest, as 
head of Lands and Recreation. In late October 
1978, as soon as the public comments came in 
from Salt Lake City, he met with his District 
Rangers in the basement of the Supervisor's 
office in Custer to review the comments and the 
previously gathered data. By the 27th he was in 
the Regional office in Denver conferring with 
officials from the Regional office, state govern-
ments, and other national forests. 
Regional Forester Craig Rupp had only 
about two weeks to make decisions on almost 
400 roadless areas. Even the Forest Service 
admitted that RARE I had lacked consistency 
between Regions, so for RARE II, every Region 
had to follow a standardized decision-making 
process (Fig. 6). This new process did not con-
sider one area at a time, and it did not choose 
one alternative from the draft environmental 
impact statement and apply it across the entire 
Region. Instead, the new process was a kind of 
algorithm that combined Alternatives C and 
I (basically, the alternatives that emphasized 
commodity values and wilderness values), and 
then ran that result through a series of "filters" 
that could move areas from one category to 
another. These filters were a fascinating rank-
ing of Forest Service priorities, since obviously 
the later the filter the greater its power. For 
example, Alternatives C and I disagreed on 
three of the Black Hills areas, so they went to 
the middle status of "Further Planning"-but 
that didn't matter because the next step put all 
four areas into nonwilderness anyway, because 
more than 90 percent of public comments 
had wished so. In later filters, Beaver Park and 
Norbeck moved to Wilderness in order to put 
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FIG. 6. Decision-making process. Figure by the author. 
some Black Hills Pine Forest into the National 
Wilderness Preservation System, but then both 
areas dropped to Further Planning because 
they had mineral potential. And that was the 
Region's recommendation: Further Planning 
for the two South Dakota areas, and nonwil-
derness for the two Wyoming areas.19 
In Washington, during the week of Thanks-
giving 1978, Forest Service chiefJohn McGuire 
and the Regional Foresters met with Assistant 
Secretary Cutler and other Department of 
Agriculture staff to make the final Forest 
Service recommendations. McGuire and 
Cutler were supposed to consider "national 
issues and needs, such as energy," as McGuire 
later said. The United States W~'S :uffering 
through inflation and an energy crisis, and the 
national forests were to contribute more oil and 
timber in order to bring energy and housing 
costs down. So one of their main goals----the 
original intent of RARE II, after all-was to 
move Further Planning areas one way or the 
other. 2o 
McGuire and Cutler moved Beaver Park 
to Wilderness and Norbeck to nonwilderness. 
They did so for a commodity: not energy or 
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timber, but game animals. The Forest Service 
acted to defend its own decades-long interest 
in the Norbeck Wildlife Preserve, namely the 
"production" of wildlife. As a Forest official 
told the Rapid City Journal, Norbeck was passed 
over "because Federal law already mandates 
its preservation for wildlife," implying that 
Wilderness designation was superfluous. (As we 
will see, the Forest would eventually claim that 
Wilderness status would conf1ict with Norbeck's 
wildlife mandate.) And once Norbeck was 
eliminated, Washington still wanted some 
Black Hills ponderosa forest in the wilderness 
system, so Beaver Park was in.21 
The final recommendations of Cutler and 
the Forest Service, unaltered by the secretary 
of agriculture, were announced on January 4, 
1979, with the release of the final environmen-
tal impact statement. Ninety days of political 
"interagency review" was to follow before the 
president would formally send his requests to 
Congress, but the Forest Service's process-
RARE II itself-was over. 
SUDDEN DEATH: THE 96TH CONGRESS 
(1979-1980) 
South Dakotans immediately threw out the 
Forest Service's final RARE II recommenda-
tion of Wilderness for Beaver Park and nonwil-
derness for Norbeck. Ninety days later, when 
the president sent his final list to Congress, 
Norbeck was on it and Beaver Park was out. Let 
us look at how this reversal came about. 
The Rapid City Journal had immediately 
turned against Beaver Park. Paul Riley, out-
doors reporter for the Journal, filed stories such 
as "Beaver Park Walk Shows Little Signs of 
Wildlife" and "Wilderness Area Rates High 
for Mineral Potential." "The Forest Service has 
chosen Beaver Park," Riley summarized in a 
news article, "even though the Norbeck area 
scored higher on the wilderness attribute rating 
system, showed no potential for gas and oil and 
had stronger local support." He combined this 
position on Beaver Park with criticism of wil-
derness in general, writing in an editorial that 
"roadless means lifeless," because the forest 
needed management to keep ponderosa in 
check.22 
State politicians, many of them just taking 
office, also rejected the Forest Service decision. 
This included the new governor, his Wildlife, 
Parks, and Forestry Commission, and the entire 
congressional delegation.23 
The local Sierra Club, which had led the 
pro-Wilderness cause back in 1977 by recom-
mending fifteen roadless areas, now split over 
what to do about the last two chances. The 
club strongly supported Norbeck, according to 
the Journal, but officially took no position on 
Beaver Park because some members wanted to 
push for two Wildernesses while others wor-
ried that Norbeck might be left out.24 Norbeck 
had been the chapter's founding cause; they 
had formed in 1972 as the ad hoc Committee 
for Preservation of Harney Peak to defeat a 
proposed tramway. Conservationists had also 
opposed a sale of timber from the Preserve in 
the early 1970s.25 By 1979, according to a later 
Forest Service document, 
[plrobably the recommendations for Beaver 
Park and Norbeck would have stood as pre-
sented in the EIS [environmental impact 
statement] were it not for the Sierra Club 
in Rapid City. Members thought it would 
be nice to have a Beaver Park Wilderness, 
although they had never considered the pos-
sibility, but they were disappointed that the 
Norbeck area was not to be accorded the pro-
tection of wilderness designation. Working 
with the procedure "to bring pressure on 
Bergland," members began a strong lobby-
ing effort, sponsored a letter-writing cam-
paign, and ultimately persuaded Governor 
Wollman, Senators McGovern and Abdnor, 
and Congressman Abourezk to support wil-
derness designation for Norbeck.26 
This unsigned document has some chronol-
ogy wrong, and may overestimate the club's 
influence on elected officials, but it is consis-
tent with the Journal's account. One chapter 
member later said that they reacted with "a 
sigh of relief" to the April 1979 decision to des-
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ignate only Norbeck. "We should have fought 
hard for both of them," said founding member 
Sam Clauson in hindsight, but they were green 
and did not appreciate how final RARE II 
would prove to be-there had been a RARE I, 
after all, then RARE II, so maybe there would 
be more.27 
And the local Forest Service-what was 
their attitude? The documents leave only hints. 
The Forest's public information officer dis-
tanced the local Forest Service from the initial 
announcement: "It's important to remember 
that [this] decision came out of Washington." 
The big Thanksgiving meeting in Washington 
contravened the Black Hills public's well-doc-
umented preference by choosing Beaver Park, 
but it is unclear where in the Forest Service 
this impulse originated-in Custer, Denver, 
or Washington. Wherever it arose, it was 
overcome by public pressure between January 
and April 1979. A later Forest document said 
merely that in this period "the anticipated 
management conflicts were found not to exist." 
But these "conflicts" did exist, and would be an 
issue through this Wilderness's legislative his-
tory.2S 
Making a Wilderness requires an act of 
Congress, and this act proved just slightly 
tricky. Carter's RARE II request was not 
handled in mass as an omnibus bill, so South 
Dakota's western congressman and senior 
senator each submitted bills covering South 
Dakota only. Once Norbeck had been chosen, 
two issues complicated this legislation: how to 
reconcile the new Wilderness with the exist-
ing wildlife Preserve and what to name the 
Wilderness. 
The minor issue was the name. The road-
less area had been "Norbeck," or "the Norbeck 
Core," after the Preserve. Once it was a proposed 
Wilderness, the Forest Service distinguished 
it from the Preserve by calling it Harney Peak 
Wilderness. But Senator McGovern introduced 
a bill in September 1979 naming it Black Elk 
Wilderness. This Lakota holy man was made 
famous by John Neihardt's book Black Elk 
Speaks, which had just been staged as a play 
at the Kennedy Center and was on its way to 
FIG. 7. The trail to Harney Peak, ca. 19205. Courtesy 
of Black Hills National Forest Historical Collection, 
Case Library, Black Hills State University. 
Broadway. Fully half of McGovern's floor com-
ments had to do with Black Elk and his visit to 
Harney Peak ("A spot, I might add, at which I 
chose to rejuvenate myself after the exertion 
of the primaries and Democratic Convention 
by which I was nominated as a candidate for 
the Presidency"). It was on Harney Peak, in 
the climax of Neihardt's book, where Black Elk 
recited "Black Elk's Prayer" and was rewarded 
with an affirmative rain shower. Abdnor held 
to "Harney Peak Wilderness," noting that "a 
large majority" of his constituents preferred 
that name. The Forest Service explicitly took 
no position.29 
The more substantial issue in the legisla-
tion was how to reconcile the existing Wildlife 
Preserve with the new Wilderness. The two 
seemed surprisingly incompatible. 
In 1920 Congress had declared the Preserve 
"set aside for the protection of game animals 
and birds and ... a breeding place [thereforl." 
All uses, even wilderness, were eventually 
judged against that single standard. A 1927 
master plan, in effect until the 1970s, called for 
fire suppression and for timber cutting aimed 
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at scenic enhancement, brush disposal, thin-
ning, and insect and disease control. Grazing 
was allowed with no increase in herd size. 
Campgrounds, picnic areas, and cabins were 
permitted when deemed consistent with wild-
life goals. A stone lookout tower adorned the 
peak. Hunting was allowed and regulated by 
the state. Congress even permitted the state "to 
erect and maintain a good substantial fence, 
enclosing [the Preserve] in whole or in part," 
but no such fence was ever built. 
The exception to all this management was 
the Upper Pine Creek Research Natural Area, 
1,190 acres of "virgin timber" just off the peak, 
set aside since 1932 as a scientific comparison 
to cutover lands, "so that present and future 
generations can see it as it was when the 
Indians used the Black Hills for their hunting 
grounds."3o 
How would Wilderness designation affect 
this use of the land? The Forest Service 
persistently couched this issue in legal lan-
guage, even though the real conflict was not 
legal. Congress had created the Preserve, and 
Congress could alter or abolish it at will. The 
whole point of a Wilderness designation, after 
all, was to supersede previous land-use plans. 
Back in 1978, during the preparation of the 
draft environmental impact statement, the 
Forest Service's Office of General Counsel had 
advised Black Hills National Forest officials 
that "[ilt is conceivable that wilderness desig-
nation of the refuge or a portion thereof could 
be contrary to the intent of the legislation 
establishing the sanctuary in that activities 
to further wildlife and habitat therefore [sic] 
may be prevented by wilderness designation."31 
And the press release following the initial 
announcement had echoed: "Norbeck was 
[allocated] to nonwilderness because wilder-
ness classification would conflict with the wild-
life purposes for which the area was set aside in 
1920 by Congress." A later Black Hills National 
Forest document added that Wilderness status 
might even have conflicted with the 1,190 acres 
of virgin Research Natural Area.32 These were 
the conflicts "found not to exist" when the 
administration flipped Norbeck and Beaver 
Park in April 1979, but they did exist, and they 
took almost two years to iron out in the legisla-
tive process. 
The real rub was not fire suppression, graz-
ing, commercial logging, or even the substantial 
stone tower at the apex of the new Wilderness. 
It was that the Forest Service and others were 
concerned about the survival of wildlife in this 
new Wilderness. This should seem odd: why 
would wildlife die in a Wilderness? Well, just 
as Custer State Park had been restocked with 
bison, elk, beaver, and other animals at its 
establishment, the Preserve was stocked with 
Rocky Mountain goats, perhaps suggested by 
the rock outcroppings. An exotic species, they 
required human manipulation of their habitat 
to thrive, especially in an era of fire suppres-
sion. By the 1970s there were an estimated 
300 to 400 goats in the herd, centered roughly 
where the Wilderness was proposed. Heavy 
foraging of favored foods like chokeberry and 
serviceberry had caused "poor plant condi-
tions," according to the Supervisor, and goat 
and elk bedding areas becoming infested with 
parasites. Controlled burning of a thousand 
acres or so, and possibly selective cutting, 
would open up the dense forest, stimulate grass 
and bushes, and create more bedding sites. 
Without continued improvements to the goats' 
forage and habitat, the Forest Service expected 
the goat herd to decline, by how much no one 
knew.33 
It came down to this: which law would 
have precedence-the 1920 Preserve statute, 
or the Wilderness Act? In September 1979 the 
Black Hills National Forest Supervisor urged 
removing the proposed Wilderness from the 
wildlife preserve, but providing for Preserve-
like maintenance of the mountain goat habi-
tat. Later that month McGovern introduced 
his Wilderness bill (the same bill proposing 
the Black Elk name) in a speech warmly 
positive toward wilderness, or at least the 
establishment of this particular Wilderness: 
"[Ilt is historically, morally, and spiritually so 
very right that we do so." This bill agreed with 
the Black Hills National Forest Supervisor: 
"The wilderness ... shall be administered ... 
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in accordance with (1) the provisions of the 
Wilderness Act ... [and] (2) the provisions 
of the Act of June 5, 1920." In his speech 
McGovern called for "biologic manipulation" 
of goat and elk habitat, particularly prescribed 
burning.34 
Three months later, on the floor of the 
House, Jim Abdnor gave a very different 
speech: 
The large majority of my constituency reacts 
negatively to the very concept of wilder-
ness .... They are violently opposed to 
the continued expansion of the authority 
of the Federal Government, [particularly 
increased] control of a basic and precious 
resource; that is, our land .... 
I sincerely resent the holier-than-thou 
attitude many of our urban cousins take 
in suggesting that they know better than 
our local rural people. . . . I am a staunch 
supporter of multiple-use management of 
our public lands-not just in some cases or 
even in most cases, but in virtually every 
case .... 
But not in this case; Abdnor proposed the 
same area for Wilderness that McGovern had. 
And interestingly, he changed McGovern's 
text to hew more closely to strict wilderness 
management; the law establishing the Preserve 
would apply only "to the extent that they 
are not inconsistent with the provisions of 
the Wilderness Act." Abdnor referred to this 
explicitly in his speech: "vegetative manipula-
tions will not be performed to increase wildlife 
populations."35 
In May 1980 the associate chief of the 
Forest Service testified to a Senate committee, 
apparently in support of Abdnor's text, that 
"habitat manipulation [was] not consistent 
with the proposed wilderness designation." The 
Wilderness could still have Preserve status, he 
said, but "the wilderness designation would 
take precedence." Yet McGovern tried again 
in September 1980, amending Abdnor's bill so 
as to require administration of the Wilderness 
"in accordance with" the Preserve statutes, 
and again calling for "continuation of wildlife 
management."36 
By then McGovern and Abdnor were in 
the last weeks of a campaign for McGovern's 
Senate seat. McGovern lost that campaign, 
and McGovern lost this minor skirmish over 
the Wilderness. Jimmy Carter signed the bill, 
now Public Law 96-560, just before Christmas 
1980, and the House-Senate conference com-
mittee had settled on the Abdnor language 
supported by the Washington Forest Service: 
the Preserve statutes applied only "to the 
extent they are not inconsistent with the pro-
visions of the Wilderness Act." 
So what was this disagreement about? The 
side issue was whether the new Wilderness 
would remain part of the Norbeck Preserve. 
South Dakotans did not want a doughnut-
shaped scrap as a memorial to their former 
governor. This was avoided by keeping the 
Wilderness nominally within the Preserve. 
(This meant, by the way, an almost perfect five-
layer concentric "wedding cake" of preserva-
tion in the Black Hills: forest, national forest, 
Preserve, Wilderness, and Research Natural 
Area. Elevation equaled protection.) 
But the heart of the Preserve/Wilderness 
question was of course that several actors shied 
away from full wilderness for the Wilderness. 
That would mean abandoning the wildlife to 
nature and accepting whatever "game crop" 
resulted. It also meant abandoning the goats. 
They were never fully wild-not just because 
people introduced them, but because people had 
to help them survive in those numbers. The goats 
needed openings in the ponderosa, and usually 
one of three things will create these openings: 
loggers, pine beetles, or fire. The politics of 
wilderness is all about letting the beetles and 
fire do it rather than the chainsaws. By chang-
ing from Preserve to Wilderness, Norbeck's core 
became "a breeding place" not only for game but 
for beetles and fires. Abdnor, just before passage 
of his bill, gave his constituents assurances on 
eight wilderness-related issues; fire, beetles, and 
logging were numbers one, two, and three. 
When faced with this issue, McGovern 
the East River environmentalist Democrat 
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tried for looser rules allowing more manage-
ment, but Abdnor the West River "wise use" 
Republican stuck tight to the Wilderness Act. 
Viewing this as a management issue, this is 
surprising. Perhaps just as Nixon could go to 
China, Abdnor could afford to do this because, 
as he said, "[Mly constituents know that I am 
anything other than a wild-eyed, environ-
mentalist rabble-rouser." But viewing this as 
part of the fight over future Wilderness des-
ignations, the contradiction disappears. The 
standard for managing a Wilderness, some have 
argued, is the same standard that any proposed 
Wilderness must meet. So a "purity policy," 
demanding strict management, is one way to 
keep the National Wilderness Preservation 
System small. Abdnor indeed stated, "It is my 
intent that this legislation will close the book 
on wilderness deliberations in my state."37 
CONCLUSIONS 
RARE II was certainly not the end of wil-
derness politics in the Black Hills. But let us 
pause here and, like Foreman and Abdnor with 
their feet on their desks, consider for a moment 
what we have learned, first about wilderness 
purity. 
During the RARE II process, South Dakotans 
tended to speak of "which area" in the Black 
Hills would be selected.38 This may have been 
political realism, but it also reflected their 
tendency to discuss Wilderness designation as 
an honor or award rather than as a land-use 
plan. They saw the designation as descriptive, 
not prescriptive. This would imply an attitude 
of purism, as if the area with the fewest marks 
against its virginity should win. 
But oddly the debate didn't turn in that 
direction; it is hard to find arguments based 
on purity. The discussion of Norbeck's goats, 
road, and tower was not whether they would 
detract from a possible Wilderness designation, 
but whether the designation would detract 
from them. There was a striking consensus, at 
least for lands with a modest human footprint, 
that the land heals itself back to wilderness. 
Particularly in this high-rainfall landscape 
where an ungraded, ungraveled road was often 
the worst disqualifier. People actually watched 
this happen, when the disastrous 1972 flood 
that struck Rapid City also washed away many 
of Beaver Park's roads. 
The national trend, since at least the 1920s, 
has been designation of ever more imperfect 
lands. But another rational concern for anti-
wilderness activists would be the land healing 
back to meet up with that loosening stan-
dard, and whether the public will accept this 
"secondary virginity" as valid. It happened at 
Harney Peak, where dialing back on the human 
impact rewilded the place to a small degree. 
In this sense it is either fitting or ironic 
that the Forest Service classified each road-
less area by its "Bailey-Kuchler ecosystem" 
(Fig. 3). The reference to geographer August 
Kuchler is remarkable because his system, often 
assumed to describe a region's natural state at 
some point in the past, in fact describes a kind 
of hypothetical future. Kuchler said his map 
showed 
the vegetation that would exist today if man 
were removed ... and if the plant succes-
sion after his removal were telescoped into 
a single moment. The time compression 
eliminates the effects of future climatic 
fluctuations, while the effects of man's ear-
lier activities are permitted to stand. The 
potential natural vegetation is a particularly 
important object of research because it 
reveals the biological potential of all sites. 
He was, in other words, mapping the entire 
United States as a kind of go-back wilderness, 
an early cartographic version of the recently 
popular "Earth after humans" genre. Perhaps 
not what the Forest Service had in mind.39 
The go-back dynamic is slippery. It makes 
more lands suitable for protection as Wilder-
ness, or as other kinds of natural preserve, thus 
complicating Jim Abdnor's wish to "close the 
book on wilderness in South Dakota." But it 
also makes more activities permissible within 
natural lands by promising a kind of natural 
self-mitigation. It is a political pretzel. 
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And what did we learn about the politics? 
First of all, that the game was indeed a politi-
cal one. After several denials that public com-
ments would be handled as vote counting, that 
is exactly how they were handled, with the vote 
counting even formalized in the publicized 
decision-making track (Fig. 6). Nationally, 
environmentalists were naive to think votes 
would not be counted, because this was already 
being discussed in the inventory phase, and 
the implication was clear: how else could sev-
eral hundred thousand "inputs" be considered? 
Discounted unless judged to be "thoughtful"? 
RARE II was accused of being a political deci-
sion with a scientific face, but it was really a 
political decision with a political face. And 
when it was done its formal results were simply 
thrown to the arena of ordinary congressional 
politics.40 
In the end, Dave Foreman's conclusions 
described the Black Hills accurately: the 
commodity interests stood firm, the conser-
vationists stood timidly against them, and so 
the chosen Wilderness was the area of least 
cost.41 But Jim Abdnor was right, too: South 
Dakotans disliked wilderness generally and 
Beaver Park distinctly, but the conflict could be 
minimized because the opposition was general 
and not truly aimed at Norbeck. The Forest 
Service played its role in the middle; if it did 
less than the environmentalists wished for, it 
also did more than the environmentalists could 
rally support for. It was national Forest Service 
officials, after all, who insisted that Black Hills 
ponderosa forest be represented in the National 
Wilderness Preservation System, and by the 
numbers even Norbeck had only 6 percent of 
the public support. 
But the main story politically is that this was 
definitely not some national imposition upon 
the Black Hills. The attempted imposition was 
rebuffed in 1979, and every local interest group 
came out satisfied. South Dakotans had power, 
at least in deciding which area was designated, 
and even in the details of how it would be 
managed. And yet the local rhetoric was a 
drumbeat of the small-state litany: big-state 
urban bureaucrats and environmentalists were 
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FIG. 8. Abdnor map. Courtesy of South Dakota 
State Archives. 
going to lock up vast expanses of the Black 
Hills. This was the tone in the news coverage, 
in the social analyses, in the Forest Service 
press releases, and in the mismatch between 
rhetoric and action so striking in Abdnor's 
House speech delivered long after the issue was 
settled in his favor. 
One last example is illustrative. In that 
spring of 1979, after South Dakotans success-
fully overturned the Beaver Park decision, Jim 
Abdnor discussed the issue in his regular mail-
ing to constituents (Fig. 8). Note that it sets up 
a choice between a Beaver Park Wilderness or 
continued multiple use for the Black Hills, as 
if Beaver Park's 5,040 acres would imperil the 
habitat, recreation, and timber industry of a 
1.2-million-acre Forest. The map illustration, 
sent out at least twice, is an illuminating bit 
of misinformation, whether deliberate or not. 
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Even at first glance the road less areas look 
suspiciously large, and overlaying this illustra-
tion onto a map of the Black Hills confirms 
this. The towns and state border are positioned 
accurately, but Norbeck (shaded gray for an 
unstated reason) is shown at about 200 percent 
of its real size. Beaver Park, in solid black, 
looms over Sturgis at about 320 percent of real-
ity. Looking at this map, which shows only the 
central portion of the national forest within 
its bounding box, one might agree that a 
major change in forest management was being 
debated, that the future of "an active forest 
management program in the Black Hills" really 
was on the table. It never was, but that is not 
the point; this map is in the realm of rhetoric, 
not reality. It is a political mind-map.42 
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